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BACKGROUND | TAXONOMY | FAQ | POLITICS | READING


Some Background and Fundamentals:


Cryptography is derived from the Greek word kruptos meaning hidden. The use of cryptography dates back to the early Egyptian civilization. Nearly 2000 years later the "Caesar Cipher" was used to protect military communications of the Roman Empire . If you're interested in a brief history of cryptography you can go off-site to review this excellent timeline for cryptographic development compiled by Carl M. Ellison from the book The Codebreakers by David Kahn and other sources.
Data encryption is conceptually straightforward: a message or item of data which we desire to keep private is transformed from its original or cleartext form to an encrypted or ciphertext form. Ciphertext data is secure from disclosure because the original data is disguised; this allows us to protect data even when we cannot control who has access to it.. This disguise is created by transforming the cleartext in accordance with a set of rules and mathematical operations called an algorithm (e.g. DES).


Many of the cryptographic algorithms in use today employ a "key". The key is simply a number (preferably a large one) used by the algorithm to transform plaintext to ciphertext, and vice versa. If the algorithm works as we'd like, every possible key value uniquely transforms the data; i.e. there is only one key in the set of all possible keys which will correctly recover the plaintext.

While it is certainly possible to develop cryptographic algorithms which do not use a key, these are generally regarded as weaker than and inferior to those that do. These algorithms rely on the principle of "security through obscurity"; that is, the operations or algorithm used to transform the data is kept secret by the designer. To appreciate this important point consider that the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm was published and released into the public domain in 1976, and has withstood 20 years of scrutiny without being "cracked". Contrast this record with the password protection offered in many of the popular desktop applications today...the cracker software page documents the failings of this approach to cryptography.

A logical question to ask is, "What makes ciphertext secure?"; i.e. given that the details of the encryption algorithm are known (and typically they are for truly secure algorithms), what is to prevent an electronic eavesdropper from simply implementing the algorithm himself, and using it to decrypt the ciphertext? To answer this question requires that we examine the role of the key in cryptography.

A cryptographic key is a numerical value provided as input to the algorithm which causes it to perform its transformations in a unique way. In other words given the same cleartext as input to an encryption algorithm, different key values will produce different ciphertext as output. We could compare the decryption process to navigating through a maze, and the key as a map of the maze; it’s easy to get through the maze with the map, but difficult without it.

Knowledge of the key value used for encryption is required to (easily) decrypt the data. Without knowledge of the key value (assuming the algorithm has no defects or weaknesses) the eavesdropper is forced to resort to a brute force, trial and error approach to recover cleartext from ciphertext; he may have to try decrypting the ciphertext with all possible key values to be sure of recovering the original cleartext. Thus the cryptographic strength of an encryption algorithm is at least partly dependent on the size, or the number of possible values of the key. We will discuss the topic of key length in greater detail in the next section.

The other determinant of cryptographic strength is the algorithm itself. A flawed algorithm is one which allows the encryption transformation to be reversed without knowledge of the key. Good cryptographic algorithms are strongly one-way transformations; they are one-way in the sense that it is easy (straightforward, at least) to transform cleartext to ciphertext, but difficult to reverse the process (without the key value). Achieving this one-way property is the Grail of cryptographic algorithm design. Unfortunately it is not currently possible to prove whether or not the Grail has been obtained; we have only the test of time as evidence.

So, key size (or key length) and algorithmic "one-wayness" are the two factors which determine cryptographic strength or security. Let’s examine how each of these factors influence security:

  • A brute force attack will always be successful given enough time and/or computational resources. Longer keys simply force your opponent to expend greater time, or devote more resources to his attack. However, unless all data is protected with a single key value the opponent must mount a brute force attack for each item of data; in other words the opponent must work just as hard to recover the second data item as he did the first.
  • Algorithmic flaws pose a much more serious threat to security. Once an algorithmic flaw has been found, all data items are compromised; the key value is no longer necessary to reverse the encryption process, and no further work is required for the opponent to recover the cleartext from any data item protected by the flawed algorithm.

A Cryptographic Taxonomy: dot_clea.gif (807 bytes)uparrow.gif (122 bytes)


While conceptually straightforward, cryptography sees widespread use today in a variety of specialized applications which employ various protocols and ancillary functions to meet their unique security requirements. Construction of a simple taxonomy of cryptographic algorithms will support a basic understanding of all cryptosystems, and which algorithms are appropriate for a specific problem.

The FAQs: dot_clea.gif (807 bytes)uparrow.gif (122 bytes)

The Politics of Cryptography (the "key escrow" debate):    uparrow.gif (122 bytes)



For some time the US Government has restricted the export of cryptographic technology. These restrictions have been justified on the basis of National Security; i.e. widespread availability of strong encryption would impair the ability of US Government agencies to extract intelligence from the intercepted communications of foreign entities.

Key escrow features are designed to provide a "back door" that would permit easy recovery of all data encrypted with the software without the user's knowledge or consent. Proponents of key escrow typically cite law enforcement and/or third party key escrow agents as the trustees of escrowed keys.

Until late 1998 US export control policies supported the inclusion of "key escrow" features through the use of an interesting incentive for cryptographic software manufacturers: The US Government granted export licenses to those manufacturers that promised (in writing) to add key escrow features to their encryption software products. To shield these manufacturers from the potentially adverse publicity resulting from adding key escrow to their encryption software the US Government agreed not to publicly disclose the names of these manufacturers.

There is also strong proponency for restrictions on domestic use of strong encryption. The most outspoken proponents of restrictions on domestic use of cryptography appear to be in law enforcement (in fact they may be the only proponents). FBI Director Louis Freeh is one of the leading lobbyists for key escrow, and has linked his position to the preservation of public safety in this published statement. Opponents of key escrow (and other restrictions on cryptographic technology) are widely published, and argue against it on the basis of personal privacy and technical practicality.

The antagonists in this debate disagree sharply on every major point - the rights of the Government to legislate cryptographic technology, the benefits of doing so, and even the ability to build a system to administer key escrow. However there is no disagreement over these facts:

  1. This is a political debate, and will be resolved through political process

  2. Political process involves registering opinions with elected representatives

If you have an opinion, you can register it with your Senators and Congressman. If you're interested in where your elected officials stand on the issue of cryptography, you can check their voting records.

We encourage you to get involved.


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